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Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in con-
flicting interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob
[Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. General setting for such games is that of correl-
ated strategies where the correlation between competing players is established through a trusted
common adviser; however, players need not reveal their input to the adviser. So far, quantum
advantage in such games has been revealed in a restricted sense. Given a quantum correlated equi-
librium strategy, one of the players can still receive a higher than quantum average payoff with
some classically-correlated equilibrium strategy. In this work, by considering a class of asymmet-
ric Bayesian games, we show the existence of games with quantum correlated equilibrium where
average payoff of both the players exceed respective individual maximum for each player over all
classically-correlated equilibriums.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum entanglement is an invaluable resource
for information processing tasks [1–3]. Entanglement
gives rise to the phenomenon of quantum nonlocal-
ity, which shows that non-communicating spatially sep-
arated parties, by presharing parts of an entangled
quantum state, can generate correlations which can-
not be explained by any local realistic theory [4–6].
Several applications of nonlocal correlations exists, for
example, in quantum cryptography [7] and nonlocal
games of full cooperation [8]. However, applications of
quantum nonlocality to achieve the best possible solu-
tion in Bayesian games of conflicting interests is a very
recent development [9–11].
Games usually model the situation of some conflict
between a given number of parties [12]. An interest-
ing connection between Bell nonlocality [5] (which can
be realized in quantum mechanics through entangled
states) and Bayesian games introduced by Harsanyi [14]
was established in [13]. Soon after, an explicit example
of a two-party game with conflicting interests where an
entangled state leads to a better solution was provided
in [9] and has inspired a number of interesting works
along this direction [10, 11, 15–19]. There had also been
previous attempts to devise quantum strategies for non-
Bayesian games, providing an advantage under certain
specific restrictions [20]; however, the physical applic-
ability of such results had been debated [21–23]. Sub-
sequent progress made in Refs. [9–11, 13, 15–19, 24] is
essentially along the direction outlined in Ref. [23].
In a Bayesian game the competing parties have only
partial information about the whole setting in which the
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game is played [14]. For example, each player may have
some random private information, such as her (his) in-
put, unknown to other players. In general, to resolve
the conflict in the best possible way, players can ar-
range a common trusted adviser facilitating correlated
strategies [25]. By resolution of conflicts it means all
players agree to adopt a strategy which is a Nash equi-
librium [26].
Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is defined as
follows: In an n players game, let S be the collection of
all possible global strategies derived from each player’s
local strategies. Let s∗i for i ∈ {1, ..., n} be some local
strategy of the ith player. Then a global strategy s∗ =
(s∗1 , ..., s
∗
n) ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium when, if any one
player, say jth, fixes her or his local strategy to s∗j and
then none of the remaining players can gain by making
unilateral changes in their local strategies.
In this work, we demonstrate a qualitatively stronger
quantum advantage in Bayesian games of conflicting
interests. For this, we introduce a class of asymmet-
ric two-player Bayesian games with conflicting interests.
The general setting for these games is that of correlated
strategies where a common trusted adviser can provide
the two players with some classical correlation or some
entangled state as an advice. Input to each player is
generated uniformly at random and is fully private in-
formation not revealed to the adviser. Payoff to each
player in a given round depends on joint input (type)
and joint output (action) of both the players. The meas-
ure of the reward to each player, on adopting a certain
strategy, is the average payoff when the game is played
for many rounds with that strategy.
Many real-world problems can be modeled through
such games; some interesting examples of such models
can be found in Refs. [9, 10, 13]. Assumption of an
uninformed (nevertheless trusted) adviser insures that
no information about one player’s input can leak to the
2other player; this assumption has been motivated in [13]
as no-signaling advice and in [10] as belief-invariant ad-
vice.
Our results can be summarized as follows. We define
a one-parameter family of asymmetric games (which in-
cludes the game defined in [9] as a special case). For
the considered class of game, we compute and ana-
lyze uncorrelated Nash equilibriums. Next, we analyze
classically correlated Nash equilibriums for our games
and find that the sum of average payoff of two play-
ers in these games is equivalent to the Bell–Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) expression up to scaling.
Then we show that with Popescu-Rohrlich–box (PR-
box) correlations the achieved Nash equilibrium has a
strong feature (also noted in [11]). Finally, we discuss a
quantum correlated strategy and show that in a certain
parameter range there are quantum Nash equilibriums
in which individual rewards to each player exceed their
respective average payoff over the set of all possible clas-
sically correlated Nash equilibriums. This is the main
result of our paper.
II. CLASS OF TWO PARTY BAYESIAN GAMES
Consider a class of Bayesian games, {G(ǫ) : 0 ≤ ǫ ≤
3/4}, played between two spatially separated players,
Alice and Bob. In each single round of the game, both
the players receive some type (input) from the set {0, 1}.
No player has any information about the type (input) of
the other player. Let types of Alice and Bob be denoted
by xA and xB, respectively, and suppose that joint input
x = (xA, xB) is sampled from a uniform distribution.
After receiving their types, players perform some action
y = (yA, yB) where yA is an action (output) of Alice
and yB is an action of Bob. The utility (payoff) function,
ui(x, y) where i ∈ {A, B}, of the game is given in Table
(I), where we use the symbol A (B) as a short hand for
Alice (Bob).
Table I. Utility functions of Alice and Bob for the considered
class of games G(ǫ) where 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 3/4.
xA ∧ xB = 0 xA ∧ xB = 1
yB = 0 yB = 1 yB = 0 yB = 1
yA = 0 (1− ǫ, 12 + ǫ) ( 0, 0 ) ( 0, 0 ) ( 34 , 34 )
yA = 1 ( 0 , 0 ) (
1
2 , 1 ) (
3
4 − ǫ, 34 + ǫ) ( 0, 0 )
In Table (I), utilities of Alice and Bob are ordered as
(uA, uB). Note that for achieving high payoffs both play-
ers need to correlate their actions when xA ∧ xB = 0 and
anticorrelate their actions when xA ∧ xB = 1. When
xA ∧ xB = 0: (i) for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1/2, Alice receives a higher
payoff when the correlated action of Alice and Bob is
(0, 0) and Bob receives a higher payoff when the correl-
ated action of Alice and Bob is (1, 1); (ii) for ǫ = 1/2,
correlating either way gives the same payoff to both the
players; and (iii) for 1/2 < ǫ ≤ 3/4, Alice benefits
from (1, 1) and Bob from (0, 0) correlation. On the other
hand, when xA ∧ xB = 1, Alice prefers (0, 1) and Bob
prefers (1, 0) correlated outcome for the entire range of
ǫ.
The average payoff that each player receives in games
G(ǫ) after a large number of rounds can be computed
from Table (I) and can be expressed as follows:
〈uA〉 = 14
{
(1− ǫ)P(00|00)+ 1
2
P(11|00)
}
+
1
4
{
(1− ǫ)P(00|01)+ 1
2
P(11|01)
}
+
1
4
{
(1− ǫ)P(00|10)+ 1
2
P(11|10)
}
+
1
4
{
(
3
4
− ǫ)P(10|11)+ 3
4
P(01|11)
}
. (1)
〈uB〉 = 1
4
{
(
1
2
+ ǫ)P(00|00) + P(11|00)
}
+
1
4
{
(
1
2
+ ǫ)P(00|01) + P(11|01)
}
+
1
4
{
(
1
2
+ ǫ)P(00|10) + P(11|10)
}
+
1
4
{
(
3
4
+ ǫ)P(10|11) + 3
4
P(01|11)
}
. (2)
We conclude this section by noting the following: (i)
The game G(0) corresponding to ǫ = 0 is the symmet-
ric conflicting-interest game introduced and analyzed
by Pappa and co-authors in [9]. (ii) For ǫ 6= 0, all the
games G(ǫ) are asymmetric and Bob has some advant-
age over Alice. (Such situations can occur, for instance,
in example 3 of the game discussed in [13], when the
two competing companies A and B can be of different
size.)
III. UNCORRELATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Consider all the possible pure (deterministic)
strategies for playing the game. Then, each player can
choose from the following four strategies:
Si1 : yi = 0,
Si2 : yi = 1,
Si3 : yi = xi,
Si4 : yi = xi ⊕ 1, (3)
3where xi is the uniformly random local input bit of the
ith player and yi is the output bit according to any of
the four possible deterministic strategies {Si1, Si2, Si3, Si4};
here the index i ∈ {A, B} is the label for the two
players Alice and Bob. Thus there are a total of 16
pure strategies for playing the game. Table (II) lists
the average payoff for each player for all possible pure
strategies.
From Table (II) one can easily find all the pure Nash
equilibriums for the considered class of games G(ǫ).
In the parameter range 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/4 the strategies
(SA1 , S
B
3 ), (S
A
3 , S
B
4 ), and (S
A
4 , S
B
2 ) are Nash equilibriums;
for 1/4 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2 the strategies (SA1 , SB1 ), (SA3 , SB4 ), and
(SA4 , S
B
2 ) are Nash equilibriums; and for 1/2 ≤ ǫ ≤ 3/4,
(SA1 , S
B
1 ), (S
A
2 , S
B
4 ), and (S
A
4 , S
B
3 ) are Nash equilibriums.
For all values of ǫ there are multiple equilibriums, and
one can easily check that the two players will have dif-
ferent preferred equilibrium and therefore there are con-
flicting interests in this game for all values of ǫ. For
example, in the parameter range 0 ≤ ǫ < 1/4, the
most preferred strategy for Alice is (SA1 , S
B
3 ) whereas
Bob gives highest preference to (SA4 , S
B
2 ).
The two players can also play this game by adopting
some mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy Alice (Bob)
chooses to implement from four pure strategies given in
Eq. (3) according to some probability distribution. First
we note that any pure equilibrium point remains an
equilibrium point in the general setting, which extends
to all possible mixed strategies. Are there any other un-
correlated mixed Nash equilibriums for this game? In
general it is mathematically complex to find all mixed
Nash equilibriums, and in the latter part of the paper
we will note that it is not necessary to explicitly com-
pute them for our purposes.
Table II. Average payoffs of Alice and Bob ordered as (〈uA〉 , 〈uB〉) for different pure strategies for the considered class of games
G(ǫ). In parameter range 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/4 the strategies (SA1 , SB3 ), (SA3 , SB4 ), and (SA4 , SB2 ) are Nash equilibriums, marked in bold
with round brackets; for 1/4 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, (SA1 , SB1 ), (SA3 , SB4 ), and (SA4 , SB2 ) are Nash equilibriums, marked in bold with curly
brackets; and for 1/2 ≤ ǫ ≤ 3/4, (SA1 , SB1 ), (SA2 , SB4 ), and (SA4 , SB3 ) are Nash equilibriums, marked in bold with square brackets.
A/B SB1 S
B
2 S
B
3 S
B
4
SA1
[{
3
4 −
3ǫ
4 ,
3
8 +
3ǫ
4
}]
( 316 ,
3
16 )
(
11
16 −
ǫ
2 ,
7
16 +
ǫ
2
)
( 14 − ǫ4 , 18 + ǫ4 )
SA2 (
1
8 ,
1
4 ) (
3
8 ,
3
4 ) (
1
8 ,
1
4 )
[
7
16 −
ǫ
4 ,
11
16 +
ǫ
4
]
SA3 (
11
16 − 3ǫ4 , 716 + 3ǫ4 ) ( 18 , 14 ) ( 14 − ǫ4 , 18 + ǫ4 )
{(
9
16 −
ǫ
2 ,
9
16 +
ǫ
2
)}
SA4 (
1
4 − ǫ4 , 18 + ǫ4 )
{(
7
16 ,
11
16
)} [
9
16 −
ǫ
4 ,
9
16 +
ǫ
4
]
( 18 ,
1
4 )
IV. CLASSICAL CORRELATED STRATEGIES
In a correlated strategy for the game, a trusted com-
mon adviser is introduced. It is assumed, as in [9], that
the adviser has no information about types that each
player receive in any given round, meaning that the
type of each player in any given round is fully private.
Therefore, the adviser can send advice even before the
start of every round of the game. Any classically cor-
related advice is simply a set of separate instructions to
both players to implement a strategy (SAi , S
B
j ) according
to some probability distribution {pij : i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
The advice from the adviser is like a preshared cor-
relation between the two players before receiving their
types (for example, preshared randomness). It is well
known that such an assumption leads to bounds on cer-
tain functions of joint conditional probabilities of player
outputs which are known as Bell-type inequalities.
It turns out that the class of games that we consider
has a nice connection with the Bell-CHSH inequality
B = 〈A0B0〉 + 〈A0B1〉 + 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉 ≤ 2 [27]. It
can be shown (see Appendix A for steps in the deriva-
tion) that the sum of average payoff of the two players
is related to the value of the Bell-CHSH expression as
〈uA〉+ 〈uB〉 = 316 (B + 4). Then from the local bound on
the Bell-CHSH expression it immediately follows that
〈uA〉C + 〈uB〉C ≤
9
8
, (4)
4where the subscript C stands for classical. Thus when
the game is played with any classically correlated
strategy the sum of average payoff of the two players
is bounded as given by Eq. (4).
On the other hand, the average payoff of the indi-
vidual player Alice (Bob) for any classically correlated
Nash equilibrium is bounded by the maximum of all
average payoffs of Alice (Bob) when the game is played
with uncorrelated pure strategies. These bounds can be
computed from Table (II) and are as follows:
〈uA〉C ≤


3
4 (1− ǫ) for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 14 ,
11
16 − ǫ2 for 14 < ǫ ≤ 12 ,
7
16 for
1
2 < ǫ ≤ 34 .
(5)
〈uB〉C ≤


3
4 for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 14 ,
11
16 +
ǫ
4 for
1
4 < ǫ ≤ 12 ,
7
16 +
3ǫ
4 for
1
2 < ǫ ≤ 34 .
(6)
Note that these bounds for 〈uA〉C and 〈uB〉C may
not be tight bounds on an average payoff for correl-
ated Nash equilibriums. However, we will see in the
following section that these bounds are sufficient to re-
veal a feature of strategies which use PR-box correla-
tions in which they outperform all classically correlated
strategies in the parameter range 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 5/8. Incid-
entally, for a different class of conflicting interest games,
such a feature of strategies which use PR-box correla-
tion was also revealed in a recent work [11].
V. NONLOCAL PR-BOX STRATEGY
Suppose Alice and Bob share the PR-box correlation
[28] provided to them as an advice from the adviser.
These correlations are the extremal no-signaling non-
local correlation with two input and two output bits. Al-
though known not to exist in nature, these correlations
are widely used as a conceptual tool to gain insight into
plausible applications of physically assessable nonlocal
quantum correlations.
Nonlocal strategy PR∗—Alice (Bob) feed type xA (xB)
as an input bit to her (his) part of the PR-box and out-
put bit yA(yB) is the action bit. Then the joint probabilit-
ies of the player’s actions given their types must satisfy
P(yA, yB|xA, xB) =
{
1
2 if yA ⊕ yB = xA ∧ xB,
0 otherwise.
(7)
With this strategy the average payoffs of the two play-
ers are as follows:
〈uA〉PR∗ =
1
2
(
3
2
− ǫ
)
, (8)
〈uB〉PR∗ =
1
2
(
3
2
+ ǫ
)
. (9)
Proposition 1. The nonlocal strategy PR∗ is a Nash equi-
librium for all G(ǫ) in the parameter range 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 5/8.
Proof. Suppose Alice deviates from the strategy PR∗,
whereas Bob’s strategy is fixed. In general, Alice can
deviate from the strategy by preprocessing the received
type and feeding the result as an input to her end of
the PR-box, and answer after some postprocessing of
the outcome from the PR-box. Any such local prepro-
cessing and postprocessing can lead to some new joint
probability distribution P˜(yA, yB|xA, xB) which can be
different from the PR-box correlation given by the Eq.
(7). However, it follows from the no-signaling prin-
ciple that P˜(yA, yB|xA, xB), obtained by local processing,
must belong to the set of no-signaling distribution. The
same argument holds when Alice keeps her strategy
fixed and Bob deviates.
Now the idea of the proof is that in the parameter
range 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 5/8, it is sufficient to maximize 〈uA〉
and 〈uB〉, given by Eqs. (1) and (2) respectively, over
the set of all no-signaling correlations. The set of no-
signaling joint probability distributions for two parties
with binary inputs and outputs is fully characterized by
Barrett et al. in [29]. The set forms an eight-dimensional
polytope with 24 vertices—16 local vertices and 8 non-
local vertices. Therefore, the maximum value of any lin-
ear function of joint probabilities P(yA, yB|xA, xB) over
the set of no-signaling correlations is achieved at some
vertex of the polytope.
By computing the value of 〈uA〉, given by Eq. (1),
for all 24 vertices, we find that 〈uA〉max = 12
(
3
2 − ǫ
)
and this maximum value is achieved at the PR-box cor-
relation given by the Eq. (7). This proves that Alice
cannot increase her average payoff by any unilateral de-
viation. For the case when Alice keeps her strategy
fixed and Bob deviates, by computing the value of
〈uB〉, given by Eq. (2), for all 24 vertices, we find that
〈uB〉max = 12
(
3
2 + ǫ
)
and is achieved at the PR-box cor-
relation given by the Eq. (7). This proves that Bob can-
not increase his average payoff by any unilateral devi-
ation.
From the bounds given by conditions (5) and (6) it
follows that the PR∗ strategy has a strong property that
〈uA〉PR∗ > Max (〈uA〉C) and 〈uB〉PR∗ > Max (〈uB〉C)
over all possible classically correlated strategies and for
all {G(ǫ) : 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 5/8}}. This result indicates that
a similar feature may exist when G(ǫ) is played with
quantum entanglement as an advice. In the following
section we show that indeed this feature also holds for
5quantum strategies, albeit for a smaller range of the
parameter ǫ.
VI. QUANTUM STRATEGY
Consider a quantum protocol for playing G(ǫ), which
is the well-known protocol for achieving the maximum
violation for the Bell-CHSH inequality [8]. We give es-
sentially the same protocol as in [8], but the shared
entangled state and measurements by the players are
slightly modified (rotated).
Quantum strategy Q∗. Let the singlet state |Ψ−AB〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) be the quantum advice shared between
Alice and Bob. The strategy of Alice is to measure σz on
receiving the type 0 and σx on receiving type 1, whereas
Bob performs measurement − 1√
2
(σx + σz) on receiving
0 and measurement 1√
2
(σx − σz) on receiving 1. The
action of Alice and Bob is to answer with 0 (1) when the
+1 (−1) eigenstate clicks. With this quantum strategy
for playing the game, the average payoffs of Alice and
Bob are as follows:
〈uA〉Q∗ =
1
4
(
1+
1√
2
)(
3
2
− ǫ
)
, (10)
〈uB〉Q∗ =
1
4
(
1+
1√
2
)(
3
2
+ ǫ
)
. (11)
The sum of the average payoff 〈uA〉Q∗ + 〈uB〉Q∗ =
3
4
(
1+ 1√
2
)
, and this value corresponds to the max-
imum Bell-CHSH violation in quantum mechanics [30].
Theorem 1. The quantum strategy Q∗ is a Nash equilibrium
for all G(ǫ).
Proof. The main steps in the proof are as follows; details
of calculation are provided in Appendix B. First we con-
sider that Alice unilaterally changes her local measure-
ments and Bob keeps his measurements fixed to those
in the quantum strategy Q∗. On receiving types 0 and
1, Alice respectively performs some two-outcome pos-
itive operator-valued measure (POVM) measurement
{X00 + X01 = I} and {X10 + X11 = I}, where X00, X01,
X00, and X01 are positive operators acting on the two-
dimensional complex Hilbert space C2. In each case
Alice answers with the measurement outcome. We then
derive the expression for maximum average payoff of
Alice over all possible POVM measurements and find
that the maximum is achieved with the strategy Q∗.
This implies that Alice cannot increase her average pay-
off by deviating unilaterally from the quantum strategy
Q∗. We then prove the same result when Alice’s meas-
urements are fixed and Bob changes his measurements
to all possible POVMs. The calculations involved in
the proof are provided in Appendix B. Finally, since
we have maximized over all possible unilateral changes
in one party measurement, it is easy to check that the
results hold even under any preprocessing of inputs or
postprocessing of measurement outcomes.
The quantum strategy Q∗, unlike the PR∗ strategy,
cannot beat the bounds on average payoffs for Alice
and Bob given by conditions (5) and (6). Interestingly,
however, by making one of these bounds tighter, as de-
rived in the following lemma, we can recover the strong
property shown by the PR∗ strategy for a subset of the
games G(ǫ).
Lemma 1. In the parameter range 1/4 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, no
classical-correlated equilibrium exists where Bob can play the
strategy SB3 with a nonzero probability.
Proof. In a classically correlated strategy players are ad-
vised to implement strategy (SAi , S
B
j ) according to some
probability distribution {pij : i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}}. This
would mean that Alice adopts strategy SAi with prob-
ability µi = ∑
4
j=1 pij, and Bob plays strategy S
B
j with
probability λj = ∑
4
i=1 pij. Now, for the parameter range
1/4 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, from Table (II), one can easily verify
that any probability distribution pij with λ3 6= 0 (i.e.,
Bob playing SB3 with a non zero probability) cannot be a
classically correlated equilibrium. This is due to the fact
that if Alice plays with such an advice (where λ3 6= 0),
Bob can always deviate from his recommended strategy
and increase his average payoff.
Theorem 2. The quantum strategy Q∗ gives a strong ad-
vantage if 314 (3−
√
2) ≤ ǫ ≤ 14 (−8+ 7
√
2), in the sense
that, in this range, both the players beat their individual max-
imum average payoff over all possible classically correlated
Nash equilibriums.
Proof. Using Lemma (1), we get a tighter bound on the
average payoff of Alice for classically correlated equilib-
rium, which is as follows:
〈uA〉C ≤ Max
{
7
16
,
3
4
− 3ǫ
4
,
}
for
1
4
≤ ǫ ≤ 1
2
.
For Bob, in the parameter range 1/4 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2 we
apply the same bound as given in the condition (6).
From these bounds, we find that 〈uA〉Q∗ > 〈uA〉C and
〈uB〉Q∗ > 〈uB〉C if c1 ≤ ǫ ≤ c2 where c1 = 314 (3−
√
2) ≅
0.34 and c2 = (−8+ 7
√
2)/4 ≅ 0.47.
Theorem (2) shows that in the class of conflicting-
interest Bayesian games that we consider, there are sev-
eral examples of games where quantum entanglement
gives a much stronger advantage than any such game
proposed so far [9, 11]. For example, G(2/5), G(3/8),
6etc. have the property that the individual average pay-
off of both players with the quantum strategy Q∗ ex-
ceeds the maximum average payoff that each player can
achieve in any classically correlated equilibrium; this
property does not hold, for example, for the game G(0)
proposed in [9].
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, in this work, by designing a class of two-
player conflicting-interest Bayesian games {G(ǫ) : 0 ≤
ǫ ≤ 3/4}, we show the existence of games where entan-
glement acts as a more powerful resource than those
discovered so far [9, 11], leading to strong quantum
solution(s). Our work also gives several examples of
unfair quantum Nash equilibriums conjectured in [11].
Interestingly, for a given quantum advice (an entangled
state), there are unfair quantum Nash equilibrium solu-
tions, which also gives the optimal social welfare solu-
tions discussed in [11].
In contrast to the classically correlated advice, a
quantum setting for the games which provides entan-
glement as quantum advice and gives freedom to arbit-
rarily choose measurement settings to both the players
is a weaker quantum advice and can still give strong
quantum solutions. It will be reasonable to consider
in future works an even stronger version of quantum
advice where the distributed quantum correlation is ex-
actly specified, i.e., where the adviser provides both the
entangled state and the measurements to the players as
black boxes generating exactly one quantum correlation
(i.e., a single quantum probability distribution). In such
frameworks it is quite likely that the quantum social
welfare solutions presented in [11] also turn out to be
Nash equilibrium.
The key quantum feature which leads to better
quantum Nash equilibriums is the existence of nonlocal
correlations in the quantum (physical) world. Since
all bipartite pure entangled states demonstrate this fea-
ture [31], it may hold that any such a quantum state
will give better quantum Nash equilibrium in some
Bayesian games of conflicting interests.
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Appendix A: Relation between the games G(ǫ) and Bell-CHSH inequality
Consider the following Bell-CHSH inequality:
B = 〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉 ≤ 2. (A1)
For i, j ∈ {0, 1}, Ai, Bj takes a value ±1 and are results (outputs) of observables of the two parties, respectively
indexed by i and j. In the language of our game, it can be thought that i, j are the types (input) of the two players,
and Ai, Bj ∈ {±1} are their respective actions (output). The expected values of product of outcomes are
〈AiBj〉 = P(−1,−1|i, j) + P(+1,+1|i, j)− P(−1,+1|i, j)− P(+1,−1|i, j).
We do a following relabeling of the outcomes, −1 7→ 0 and +1 7→ 1, and then we get
〈AiBj〉 = P(0, 0|i, j) + P(1, 1|i, j)− P(0, 1|i, j)− P(1, 0|i, j). (A2)
Upon inserting Eq. (A2) in the Bell-CHSH expression B = 〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉, using normaliza-
tion conditions for probabilities, and from the expressions for 〈uA〉 and 〈uB〉 respectively given by Eqs. (1) and (2)
one can obtain that 〈uA〉+ 〈uB〉 = 316 (B + 4).
Appendix B: Complete proof of the Theorem 1.
In the quantum strategy Q∗ the state shared between Alice and Bob is the two-qubit singlet state:
|Ψ−AB〉 =
1√
2
( |01〉 − |10〉 ). (B1)
7Suppose one player’s measurement strategy is fixed to that of Q∗. Let the other player deviate from Q∗, which he
or she can do by choosing two arbitrary POVM measurements on receiving the respective types 0 and 1, which in
general can be respectively expressed by M0 : X00 + X01 = I and M1 : X10 + X11 = I, where
X00 =
1
2
(
a0+a3 a1−ia2
a1+ia2 a0−a3
)
, where a0, a1, a2, a3 ∈ R and
√
a21 + a
2
2 + a
2
3 ≤ a0 ≤ 2−
√
a21 + a
2
2 + a
2
3, (B2)
X10 =
1
2
(
b0+b3 b1−ib2
b1+ib2 b0−b3
)
, where b0, b1, b2, b3 ∈ R and
√
b21 + b
2
2 + b
2
3 ≤ b0 ≤ 2−
√
b21 + b
2
2 + b
2
3. (B3)
Let us denote
√
a21 + a
2
2 + a
2
3 = ||~a|| and
√
b21 + b
2
2 + b
2
3 = ||~b||. Note that 0 ≤ a0, b0, ||~a||, ||~b|| ≤ 1, and for all
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ai ≤ ||~a|| and bi ≤ ||~b||.
The proof of Theorem 1 is as follows:
Proof. Let Bob’s strategy be fixed, i.e., his measurements are − 1√
2
(σx + σz) on receiving 0 and
1√
2
(σx − σz) on
receiving 1, and let Alice’s two measurements be M0 and M1. Then on calculating, the analytical expression for
Alice’s average payoff turns out to be:
〈uA〉Q =
1
32
[
(9− 4ǫ) +
{
(2− 4ǫ)a0 + (3
√
2− 2
√
2ǫ)a3
}
+
{
b0 + (3
√
2− 2
√
2ǫ)b1
}]
. (B4)
Case 1. If 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2, then,
〈uA〉Q ≤
1
32
[
(9− 4ǫ) +
{
(2− 4ǫ)(2− ||~a||) + (3
√
2− 2
√
2ǫ)||~a||
}
+
{
(2− ||~b||) + (3
√
2− 2
√
2ǫ)||~b||
}]
=
1
32
[
(15− 12ǫ) +
{
(−2+ 3
√
2) + (4+ 2
√
2)ǫ
}
||~a||+
{
(3
√
2− 1)− 2
√
2ǫ
}
||~b||
]
≤ 1
32
[
(15− 12ǫ) +
{
(−2+ 3
√
2) + (4+ 2
√
2)ǫ
}
+
{
(3
√
2− 1)− 2
√
2ǫ
}]
=
1
4
(
1+
1√
2
)(
3
2
− ǫ
)
.
Case 2. If 1/2 < ǫ ≤ 3/4, then,
〈uA〉Q ≤
1
32
[
(9− 4ǫ) +
{
(2− 4ǫ)||~a||+ (3
√
2− 2
√
2ǫ)||~a||
}
+
{
(2− ||~b||) + (3
√
2− 2
√
2ǫ)||~b||
}]
=
1
32
[
(11− 4ǫ) +
{
(2+ 3
√
2)− (4+ 2
√
2)ǫ
}
||~a||+
{
(3
√
2− 1)− 2
√
2ǫ
}
||~b||
]
≤ 1
32
[
(11− 4ǫ) +
{
(2+ 3
√
2)− (4+ 2
√
2)ǫ
}
+
{
(3
√
2− 1)− 2
√
2ǫ
}]
=
1
4
(
1+
1√
2
)(
3
2
− ǫ
)
.
Therefore for any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 3/4, the maximum value of 〈uA〉Q over all M0 and M1 turns out to be
1
4
(
1+ 1√
2
) (
3
2 − ǫ
)
, which is the same as 〈uA〉Q∗ . Hence, Alice cannot increase her average payoff by deviating.
Now let Alice’s strategy be fixed, i.e., her measurements are σz on receiving 0 and σx on receiving 1, and let Bob’s
two measurements be M0 and M1. Then, upon calculating, the analytical expression for Bob’s average payoff turns
out to be
〈uB〉Q =
1
32
[15+ {(−2+ 4ǫ)a0 + (−3− 2ǫ)a1 + (−3− 2ǫ)a3}+ {(−1+ 4ǫ)b0 + (3+ 2ǫ)b1 + (−3− 2ǫ)b3}] . (B5)
By similar steps as adopted for maximizing the analytical expression for Alice’s average payoff, one can obtain the
maximum for Bob. The maximum value of 〈uB〉Q over all M0 and M1 turns out to be 14
(
1+ 1√
2
) (
3
2 + ǫ
)
, which is
same as 〈uB〉Q∗ . Thus Bob cannot increase his average payoff by deviating. Therefore, we can finally conclude that
the quantum strategy Q∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
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